In a publishing world where there is no shortage of books about the biblical creation account, especially from the early chapters of Genesis, add one more from P & R publishing by Old Testament Professor C. John Collins at Covenant Theological Seminary (St. Louis, MS). This book differs from many other recent books on creation: it is scholarly, incorporates recent linguistic method, engages the science and faith issue, trods through the theological heights while not neglecting serious and sustained exegetical commentary, and yet-in the end-makes some disappointing claims that have no little consequences for systematic theology. This last point is crucial since Collins views his work as explicitly theological in all its manifestations for the various loci of biblical and theological studies.
Collins uses a "discourse-oriented literary approach," which according to him, is the most important contribution to a greater rigor in the treatment of this topic. Discourse linguistics is a term not easily unpacked since it includes a wide purview of topics for its study, including, but not limited to, embedded features of language reflecting social interactions, the study of larger chunks of language beyond the clause and phrase level, and other areas as well. Collins attempts to illumine our understanding of Genesis 1 to 4 by paying close attention to the details and how they are integrated within the larger context.
The outline of the book is fairly straightforward: chapter 2 illustrates the method the author is using; chapter 3 places these four chapters of Genesis into their literary context; chapters 4 to 7 explores the exegetical nuts and bolts of Genesis 1 to 4; chapter 8 raises the question of possible sources; chapter 9 covers the communicative intent of Genesis 1 to 4; chapter 10 interestingly examines the relationship of science, faith, and historical questions that Genesis 1 to 4 undoubtedly raise, especially in conservative circles; and finally, chapter 11 examines the ramifications of Genesis 1 to 4 for a Christian's worldview today.
The strengths of this text are many. First, for example, wading through the waters of Collins's new book will aid us, in this reviewer's opinion, in reading other Scripture texts as well. Second, it is nice to see Collins inviting the reader to sit "lightly" on the notion of necessary sequentiality between the various days of creation. In fact, after his detailed exposition, Collins predicates that the nature and lengths of the days of creation are not the main communicative interest of the text. Anyone familiar with the debates over the nature and length of the creation days in conservative circles will recognize why this is significant. Third, Collins has rightly classified the character of the Hebrew of Genesis 1, which is not poetry, but "exalted prose narrative."
Although this reviewer learned much from Collins's project and there is much here to commend the book, there are certain descriptions of other positions and predications in the book that warrant criticism. Only the most major shortcoming will receive comment here. Collins in his discussion of the crucial chair passage dealing with what Reformed theologians have called the covenant of works (i.e., Gen. 2:15-17) needs further clarification.
After establishing that we may label this interaction between God and Adam in the pre-lapsarian era a covenant, Collins asks the crucial question, "[S]hall we call it a 'covenant of works'?" Correctly, Collins then goes to Romans 5:12-21 for help, where Reformed exegetes have often turned for the Pauline Adam-Christ, first Adam/second Adam analogy that is so instructive regarding the nature of the relationship between the federal headship of Adam vis-à-vis that of Christ, the second Adam. He notes the manner in which this has been expressed: "[T]he two covenant heads must be equivalent: just as Jesus earned [emphasis his] life for those he represents, so Adam must have been able to earn life for those he represented." The very way he states the position, however, prejudices the case.
Collins incorrectly predicates that Romans 5 depends more on disanalogy than it does on pure analogy. Then, Collins makes the statement that "it seems better to think of Adam's action as the work of covenant representation, without introducing the idea of merit" (114). It is understandable that Collins wants to avoid the language of merit since the reformers and their heirs often did given the circumstances in which they lived and fought for faithfulness to biblical teaching.
The above statement by Collins, however, is a misunderstanding of the function of analogy and the particular analogy in Paul's epistle as it relates to the relationship between Romans 5 and Genesis 1-3. Moreover, it undermines the very necessity and purpose of the analogy at this point: to introduce an appropriately nuanced view of merit.
The very nature of analogy is that it predicates some things similar and some things dissimilar between two things being compared. In Romans 5, there is a parallelism here between Adam and Christ, but there is also contrast. And the contrast is one of degree and consequence (here the reviewer follows Doug Moo). The comparison of degree is set forth in 5:15a, which reads, "not as the trespass, so also is the free gift." This is explained in the climactic verse 19 as the work of Christ being more powerful than Adam.
The second contrast, the one of consequence, is that Paul says (5:17a) that although death reigned by dint of the transgression of the one, that is, Adam, nevertheless by means of an argument from the lesser to the greater, Paul says (5:17b) that there will be a great reversal, "much more" for those who receive the abundance of grace and the gift of righteousness.
Of course, after the fall, a mere mortal is never able to merit anything whatsoever from God. Whatever good proceeds from us is anticipated by God's work for and within us. Predicating the possibility of Adam meriting a higher state (with consequences for his progeny in perpetuity) upon condition of his obedience is not jeopardizing the Creator/creature distinction as long as, following Aquinas and others, we recognize and state precisely that human actions have a meritorious character "on the presupposition of divine ordination," (Summa Theologia, 1a, 2ae, 114.1), that is, if and when God sets the conditions to be such. Such a carefully qualified definition of merit in the context of the covenant in the garden before the Fall may be endorsed.
